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Abstract 
 
Design flaws have been contributing to major industrial accidents. However, de-
sign activities are understudied in human and organisational factors studies. In 
the nuclear power domain, both pre-operational design and design of modifica-
tions depend on a network of organizations, and aim at developing solutions 
which meet different criteria. Nuclear power companies often outsource the de-
sign work to organisations, which might not be hitherto familiar with the safety 
requirements of nuclear industry.  
The final phase of SADE project focused on testing and evaluating the results of 
the first two phases through in depth analysis of case studies conducted in 
Finland and Sweden. The study aimed at providing insights on the inter-
organizational challenges related to design activities, which could potentially af-
fect safety of the Nordic nuclear power plants. In 2013 we carried out 14 semi-
structured interviews with representatives of power plant organisations, design 
organisations and regulators. Interviews of the Finnish case studies were com-
plemented by one group interview each. 
The study indicated that design-related challenges in the nuclear domain are 
mainly inter-organizational. This implies that safety management and safety cul-
ture approaches should take better into account the inter-organisational nature of 
work processes. For some of the challenges (e.g. coordination) many coping 
practices exist throughout the network, whereas for others (e.g. shared under-
standing) just a few were mentioned. This signifies that design organisations 
have learned the consequences of insufficient coordination in previous projects, 
while reaching a shared understanding proves to be challenging.  
The design process involves both rational and creative approaches to deal with 
real-life problems. In nuclear industry, designers face the need to balance be-
tween fulfilling requirements and doing an extensive amount of paperwork, and 
creating new, safe and functional solutions. To better manage safety culture in 
design activities in a networked context, nuclear power companies and design 
supply chains need to reach a shared understanding on achieving this balance. 
Finally, the study provides a set of recommendations to support and improve the 
design process and to help anticipate emerging risks in the nuclear industry. 
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Abstract 
Design flaws have been contributing to major industrial accidents. However, design activities 
are understudied in human and organisational factors studies. In the nuclear power domain, 
both pre-operational design and design of modifications depend on a network of 
organizations, and aim at developing solutions which meet different criteria. Nuclear power 
companies often outsource the design work to organisations, which might not be hitherto 
familiar with the safety requirements of nuclear industry.  
The final phase of SADE project focused on testing and evaluating the results of the first two 
phases through in depth analysis of case studies conducted in Finland and Sweden. The study 
aimed at providing insights on the inter-organizational challenges related to design activities, 
which could potentially affect safety of the Nordic nuclear power plants. In 2013 we carried 
out 14 semi-structured interviews with representatives of power plant organisations, design 
organisations and regulators. Interviews of the Finnish case studies were complemented by 
one group interview each. 
The study indicated that design-related challenges in the nuclear domain are mainly inter-
organizational. This implies that safety management and safety culture approaches should 
take better into account the inter-organisational nature of work processes. For some of the 
challenges (e.g. coordination) many coping practices exist throughout the network, whereas 
for others (e.g. shared understanding) just a few were mentioned. This signifies that design 
organisations have learned the consequences of insufficient coordination in previous projects, 
while reaching a shared understanding proves to be challenging.  
The design process involves both rational and creative approaches to deal with real-life 
problems. In nuclear industry, designers face the need to balance between fulfilling 
requirements and doing an extensive amount of paperwork, and creating new, safe and 
functional solutions. To better manage safety culture in design activities in a networked 
context, nuclear power companies and design supply chains need to reach a shared 
understanding on achieving this balance. Finally, the study provides a set of recommendations 
to support and improve the design process and to help anticipate emerging risks in the nuclear 
industry. 
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1. Introduction  
Design issues have often been found as a contributing cause to accidents across different 
industrial domains: 55 percent of accidents in chemical industry and 46 percent of accidents 
in nuclear industry can be attributed at least partially to design errors (Taylor, 2007). Some 
examples are Turkish Airlines Flight 981 crash in 1974, the Challenger space shuttle 
explosion in 1986, Piper Alpha oil rig explosion in 1988, the capsize of the MS Estonia ferry 
in 1994, or the Wenzhou high speed train collision in 2011. In the nuclear industry, between 
1985 and 1997, more than 3100 licensee event reports have identified design-based issues 
(Lloyd et al., 2000). In particular, the analysis of the Three Mile Island reactor accident 
(1979) revealed a basic design flaw for pressurizer relief valve (which failed open instead of 
closed), as well as design problems in the control room. Various design issues (e.g. the height 
of the tsunami protection wall, the location of the emergency diesel generators) emerged in 
the analysis of the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011) as well.  
Nordic nuclear power plants have also encountered design-related problems. In 1992 in 
Sweden, a safety valve of the main steam system opened at Barsebäck unit 2 causing the 
disintegration of coverings and insulation materials from adjacent pipelines (www.analys.se, 
2004). Parts of disintegrated material ended up in the reactor containment and caused 
clogging of the strainers for the emergency core cooling system. In 2008 in Finland, the 
reactor trip at Olkiluoto 1 resulted from a design issue with the generator voltage regulator 
(Kainulainen, 2009). In 2010 in Sweden, a possible common cause related design flaw on 
four valves caused an abrupt stop of the steam to the condenser leading to a short and 
relatively high pressure spike in the Oskarshamn 3 reactor (www.archive-se.com, 2010).  
Design error is defined as “a feature of a design which makes it unable to perform according 
to its specification” (Taylor, 2007a: 62). The study of design errors has recently received 
increased attention in the field of safety science and strategies for preventing their occurrence 
have been proposed (Hatamura, 2009). The role of human and organizational factors (HOF) 
and the contribution of safety culture to the safe operation of nuclear power plants have been 
acknowledged (IAEA, 2005). Human factors and ergonomics are usually considered when 
conceiving and designing tools, interfaces and systems to provide end-users with artefacts 
satisfying usability criteria (e.g. context of use, easiness of use, learnability, satisfaction, etc.). 
Still, the design organisations and design processes have seldom been the subject of human 
factors or safety culture studies.  
 
2. Project objectives  
A jointly funded SAFIR2014 and NKS-R project has been established in 2011 to identify 
organizational challenges associated with design and implementation activities, and to 
provide recommendations to the nuclear industry community to support and improve the 
design process and to anticipate emerging risks. The research project approached design from 
safety culture and resilience engineering perspectives. The following three research questions 
were set at the beginning of the project:  
1. What are the current organizational challenges (trade-offs, user involvement, supply 
chains, design errors, etc.) in the design and implementation activities and how they 
ultimately affect the safety of the operating power plant? 
2. What kind of safety culture characteristics (risk understanding, mindfulness, etc.) are 
required during the design of new technological and organisational solutions in order 
to contribute to resilient nuclear power plants?  
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3. How can the Resilience Engineering and the safety culture theory (Rollenhagen, 2010; 
Reiman et al., 2012) contribute to improving design and implementation practices 
when hindsight data are not available? 
3. Design in the nuclear industry as an object of study 
In general, design can be conceived as the process of inventing, creating, and implementing 
(technical) artefacts (Bergman et al., 2007). This process takes place under uncertainty 
(Norros, 2004), relates to innovation and rational decision making (Aspelund, 2006), and 
incorporates aspects of planning, decision making, and management (Trueman, 1998). In the 
nuclear power industry, the term “design” has been used to refer both to the process of 
designing something and to the end product of this process. Therefore, when discussing about 
safety of design and safety culture in design the two meanings have to be clarified and 
considered because the two meanings are intertwined. 
On the one hand, when the concern is design as end product, its safety and risks that its 
introduction in nuclear power systems can create, the focus is in improving design by letting 
the designers consider the future usage of the designed system already in the design phase. 
Human Factors Engineering (HFE) represents a well-established body of knowledge and 
expertise for this purpose. International regulator guidelines emphasize the need to consider 
HFE issues at different phases of the design process. According to EPRI-1008122, the 
application of HFE aims to ensure that a) the roles and tasks of NPP personnel are clearly 
defined, b) staffing levels and qualifications are adequate to fulfil the requirements of human 
tasks and, c) task performance requirements and human psychological and physiological 
characteristics are considered in the design of human-system interfaces (HSIs), procedures 
and training.  
The Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model has been applied worldwide to 
evaluate the benefits of inclusion of HFE principles and methods in the design of HSIs, and to 
evaluate the implemented design. Several stakeholders are concerned with the area of HFE 
but Human Factors Engineering is mainly related to the activity of the design organization. 
HFE in the design organization focuses on the organization’s way of taking the usage point of 
view into account in design. Accordingly, well defined HFE processes are a nominal feature 
of safety culture in design. The extent to which HFE is taken into account varies between 
utilities and different projects within a specific utility. The amount of HFE focus seems to be 
increasing in recently started projects though. The Regulator’s role in nuclear domain is to 
monitor, inspect and follow that all regulations are fulfilled by the production and design 
organizations, that is, to maintain oversight of that HFE principles are being conducted in the 
design organization. 
On the other hand, when design is considered as an activity, the central question is how to 
make sure that the outcome of the design process is going to be safe. An implicit assumption 
of this is that the quality and safety of the end product is influenced by the design process 
itself. Aspelund (2006) described the design process as consisting of ideas conception, 
planning and explaining, making decisions related to the development of the ideas, and 
solving the problem. One can also consider even broader aspects of design as a process, by 
also taking into account planning and management (Trueman, 1998). Furthermore, Mark et al. 
(2007) define “design” as the practice of inventing, creating, and implementing (technical) 
artefacts that depend upon, integrate, and transform heterogeneous and uncertain domains of 
knowledge. Design process aims at designing several different elements or components of a 
system, from training to human system interfaces, to procedures or structures etc. Design in 
an industrial context can be viewed as an iterative process, which aims at creating an artefact 
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to solve an expressed problem or to meet a certain need. This process is a combination of 
analytical problem solving and innovative creation of new features and combinations. The 
resulting artefact cannot be known in detail in advance but the function(s) that the artefact 
should fulfil can be known and should be specified early in the process. The different steps in 
a design process can be summarised as follows:   
1) Identification and development of requirements for the end product; 
2) Development of conceptual design (“rough” picture of the design).This is especially 
needed when the designed component is supposed to interact with other loosely 
defined components and systems; 
3) Development of detailed design of the component or system; 
4) Evaluation of the detailed design (and its functions with the other interdependent 
components/systems); 
5) Implementation of the component/system;  
6) Testing the component during its usage. 
Design process is a collective effort that involves several stakeholders. No one individual 
designer alone can ensure that the designed end product is functional and safe and complies 
with the strict regulatory requirements and design principles of the nuclear industry. Rather, 
the design process can be understood as a complex interaction and negotiation process 
between different experts and organisations. We have identified the key organisations 
involved in design processes in the nuclear industry and their main tasks (see Macchi et al., 
2013). People doing the actual hands-on design work can be in-house personnel of the nuclear 
power company but often the design work is outsourced in design organisations, which 
usually provide services for other industries as well. Therefore, design organizations are not 
necessarily familiar with the nuclear industry context and its specific requirements. 
Design in the nuclear industry is highly regulated. Depending on the function and safety class 
of the system to be designed it may be that each step in the process has to be approved by the 
regulator. The components, systems and constructs have to withstand a certain range of 
identifiable conditions and events without exceeding pre-specified authorized limits. This 
certain range of conditions and events that the plant and its components and systems need to 
withstand is called the design basis (IAEA, 2007). Whether the designed product will hold out 
in predefined possible conditions well enough is evaluated using both deterministic and 
probabilistic calculation methods. The results of these calculations are checked and approved 
by the Regulator.  
The principle of defence-in-depth has been a central safety principle for design in the nuclear 
industry. The interpretation of this concept has evolved during the years, and in practice it is 
used with several but closely connected meanings. In the IAEA’s (2007) safety glossary the 
concept of defence-in-depth was defined as “a hierarchical deployment of different levels of 
diverse equipment and procedures to prevent the escalation of anticipated operational 
occurrences and to maintain the effectiveness of physical barriers placed between a radiation 
source or radioactive material and workers, members of the public or the environment, in 
operational states and, for some barriers, in accident conditions.” The concept means that 
components and systems should be designed in a way that if one of them breaks down, 
another defence layer still remains to protect the environment and population from the 
harmful effects of radiation.  
Other important safety principles in the nuclear industry are redundancy, diversification and 
physical separation. In general, redundancy means that there are several similar subsystems 
for carrying one function and either one of them alone is sufficient for carrying out that 
function. Diversification refers to existence of several systems that carry out the same 
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function; however, their functioning is based on different principles or mechanisms. Physical 
separation means that the parallel subsystems or equipment are situated in distinct physical 
locations and are not connected to each other.  For exact definitions of the terms redundancy, 
diversification and physical separation, please refer to the STUK’s YVL guide 
B.1/15.11.2013 and Government Decree 717/2013. 
Although each design domain can be expected to manifest unique characteristics for the 
particular skills needed, some general psychological features can be identified. Design 
activities are associated with open problem spaces rather than closed ones. Design is a 
dynamic cognitive act where several different solutions to a problem might be possible. 
Veland (2010) argues that design in the nuclear industry requires special kind of “design 
thinking”, which is different than technical-rational problem solving. According to him, a 
process skill should be core competence of a designer, e.g. the designer needs to “think on his 
feet” when immersed in active, flexible, reflective exploration of the problem space.  
A closer look reveals an interesting dynamics between “conservatism” and “flexibility” when 
positioning design in the specific context of the nuclear power industry. Navigating in an 
open and dynamic problem space involves uncertainty. Still, incremental changes in existing 
structures (hardware, software, organisational, etc.) can be challenging from a safety point of 
view as well. This dynamics is relevant for issues about safety culture in design: we would 
expect that designers of safety critical systems are facing tensions between their roles as 
innovators, and the limitations set by rules and regulations due to nuclear power specific 
technical design principles.  
In design of safety critical systems it is often a good practice to develop transparent decision-
making processes. If information is properly documented and stored, it is easier to change the 
system later. However, from a psychological perspective, it could be challenging for a 
designer to continuously document the design process and why e.g. one solution is preferred 
to another. Documentation takes time and may be perceived as unnecessary and disturbing. 
Also, there might be more uncertainty behind design decisions than a designer wants to 
reveal. In safety critical systems, both the public and the buyer of a system want to be sure 
that the designed end-product is safe and to be open about the uncertainties of the design 
process may therefore be a challenge for design organisations. 
  
4. Improving design by managing safety culture 
Since its introduction after the Chernobyl accident, the concept of safety culture has been 
increasingly applied in research and practice in different industrial settings (IAEA, 1986). The 
concept was defined by IAEA (1991, p.4) as follows:  
“Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in 
organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding 
priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by 
their significance.”  
The main body of research and practical applications associated with safety culture are mainly 
focused on “sharp end” activities in the operational context rather than technological design. 
We stated that criteria for good safety culture in different industrial domains are the same but 
the manifestations of those may differ, as well as the associated challenges. 
Despite the different approaches and definitions, the concept of safety culture facilitates the 
possibilities to address different “soft” aspects of safety management, such as norms, 
attitudes, behaviour and expectations. However, the concept of safety culture has not been 
applied extensively in the context of design activities. The people taking part in the design 
process are human too and cultural phenomena affect them just as much the people in 
 8 
 
operation and maintenance. Common to most definitions of safety culture is that they consider 
culture as a collective attribute; something that people share in terms of beliefs, values, 
perceptions, attitudes and behaviour. Nonetheless, the analytical unit in use when 
characterising a culture is a tricky question as cultures exists at many levels both inside and 
outside an organisation. For example, Thompson et al. (1998) argue that there might be 
differences among management levels with respect to safety culture characteristics, which in 
turn influence how management acts toward subordinates in safety related matters. The 
existence of various subcultures in organisations is easily observed and a question then arises 
if it makes sense to speak about an overriding organisational culture containing attributes 
shared by all different subcultures. In networked design context, subcultures could turn into a 
challenge when the aim is to assess safety culture. That is, both the concepts of organizational 
culture and safety culture include the subculture issue; it is even harder to implement the 
concept of organizational culture in networked environments. 
Many generic models of organisational culture have been proposed. One of the more 
influential models was developed by Schein (1992) who differentiates among several layers 
of organisational culture. At the deepest level, an organisational culture is assumed to be 
characterised by a set of basic assumptions (e.g., the nature of human beings). These 
assumptions, Schein argues, then will influence what is called “espoused values” e.g. values 
and norms that could be represented by policies, strategies and goals (the second level). 
Artefacts (the third level) are the most salient and visible aspects of an organisational culture 
and can be seen in dress codes, architecture, work processes, organisational structures etc. For 
Schein, it is rather difficult to understand a culture’s deepest roots since some of its 
antecedents might have been forgotten. On the other hand, Schein also warns about the 
difficulties of interpreting whether an observed behaviour is an artefact of the culture or rather 
caused by situational and individual factors. Applying Schein’s generic model to safety 
culture one could use observations and questionnaires to grasp the surface oriented climate 
aspects. However, in order to develop a deeper understanding of safety culture, more 
qualitative approaches are needed.   
In the context of design, Schein’s general approach opens for interesting questions. What are 
the basic assumptions that drive design organisations towards a particular design solution? 
For example, what are designer’s assumptions about the “operators” that should manage a 
nuclear power plant? Are the designers striving to design for the operators, or to design 
operator-proof solutions; that is, do the designers see operators as a threat to safety or as 
people who create safety with the solutions provided by the designers? Further, how do the 
designers understand the plant’s functioning and the meaning of the safety principles? Or 
what kind of hazards the designers assume to be relevant in a nuclear power plant context? 
Answers to such questions could clarify certain issues sometimes perceived as design flaws in 
the interface between man and machine. Moreover, the design of instructions, work processes, 
etc. sometimes reveals an idealistic view on what people can accomplish in a certain context – 
a focus on basic assumptions may reveal distorted world views which make a design less 
optimal for operation. Reason (1998) argues that a safe organisation is characterized by an 
informed culture, which continuously collects and shares information about hazards. This 
means both to collect information about own and others’ events, as well as to perform risk 
analysis activities. Both processes constitute a cornerstone in safety management systems. 
However, for external design organisations these features of safety culture are not always easy 
to manage because information about events usually resides in the operating organisations. 
Consequently, to develop an informed culture, providers of nuclear designs must develop a 
network of contacts with operators.  
 9 
 
Design processes can be perceived as distributed decision making where a number of 
different stakeholder has to cooperate in order to reach a safe and reliable design. Decision 
making is a continuous process involving many stakeholders – the decisions are thus 
distributed rather than being controlled by a single actor. Each stakeholder (individuals and 
groups) always have a limited view of the whole system (a bounded rationality). Cooperation, 
coordination and trade-offs are thus necessary to reach the goals. How a system involving 
many stakeholders succeeds in fulfilling its task is a difficult organisational problem which 
has no clear answer. Usually some kind on self-organisation emerges representing an informal 
organisation and not necessarily the same as in the organisational charts. Particularly in 
situations where large uncertainties exist, the organisation must adaptively and dynamically 
use all its resources. Regarding this problem Brehmer (1991:9) states: 
“An organisation that cannot foresee all the problems that it will encounter, nor all the 
resources that it will command, must rely upon self-organisation to solve its task. How the 
capability for self-organisation is to be built into an organisation is something of a 
mystery, if not an outright contradiction”. 
A central factor to achieve goals in a distributed network of actors is communication. 
Nowadays the wide availability of various communication technologies facilitates easy 
contacts. Still, in a distributed network of several stakeholders, constructing coherent and 
shared plans can be challenging because different participants have their limited view of the 
situation. One suggested way to solve this problem has been the multi-agent planning 
approach (Durfee et al., 1989). Adopting such a strategy, all the stakeholders (or nodes in the 
network) construct a multi-agent plan specifying future actions, resources, etc. This rather 
common approach has its limitations because each stakeholder usually need timely and 
correct information about the others, as well as means to resolve conflicts. An alternative 
approach to coordination is to use partial global planning (Durfee and Lesser, 1988). This 
approach builds on the idea that in dynamic and complex environments information must be 
continuously updated and plans reformulated in view of new information. Local actors are 
given freedom to build their own plans and these are shared with others in the network to 
improve coordination. The system boundary is drawn widely to include a number of different 
stakeholders of relevance for the success of a safety-critical project. Considering the topic for 
the present research we define nuclear design activities as a class of activities in the nuclear 
domain which involve a set of stakeholders (e.g. power plants, regulators, vendors, 
consultants).  
Traditionally, the concept of safety is applied to individual organisations. Also, the traditional 
perception of the concepts of safety culture (and safety climate) has, with some exception, not 
been particularly focused on design activities and their relation to safety culture. We find it 
thus important to expand the concept of safety culture towards a network where each 
stakeholder constitutes a culture of its own (containing subcultures). We can think of a 
network of safety culture and a set of activities (e.g. nuclear design/modifications) by 
identifying some of the critical safety culture factors for such a network. Based on the 
literature on distributed decision making, it could be suggested that one of the key factors for 
understanding safety culture in a network is cooperation and communication in the network. 
Three main factors are suggested to influence the communication coherence in a network: 
relevance, timeliness and completeness (Durfee et al., 1989, cited in Brehmer, 1991). With 
respect to relevance, it is important that the actors in the network agree upon what particular 
issues are of relevance and thus get prioritised. If some actors in the network give priority to 
issues that the others will find less relevant, then it is less likely that focus and coherence in 
the network will generate the desired outcomes. A problem with implications for design is 
that some issues which are represented and focused by some actors in a network are relevant 
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for safety but other actors fail to perceive this relevance. Timeliness is usually very important 
in the sense that the right information must be presented in a timely manner to have a positive 
effect on the (design) process. Completeness refers to sharing a common mental model by all 
the actors in the network. It appears that Reason’s (1989) concept of “informed culture” (e.g. 
knowledge about events and risks, others’ tasks, etc.) could be seen as an important factor for 
a network safety culture. This, in turn, evokes all the issues associated with communication 
among the stakeholders in the network, including setting up an efficient communication 
structure. This feature of a network safety culture also triggers a need to develop a systemic 
model of nuclear safety including a broad set of factors important for safety management. An 
ethical aspect is also relevant for a network safety culture: stakeholders should develop a 
shared understanding on the ethical code for resolving trade-offs and negotiations in the 
network.  
Recently, an attempt to define the basics of network safety culture in the nuclear domain was 
made by Gotcheva et al. (2012). Drawing on the work of Reiman and Oedewald (2009) and 
Oedewald et al. (2011) they have suggested that a network of organizations should be taken as 
the unit of analysis from the very beginning in order to analyse the predominant (presumably 
shared and somehow mutually accepted) views or conceptions, or their lack thereof, which 
affect the behaviours and produce certain outcomes in the organizational network with regard 
to safety.  
Because of the complexity of activities, organisations face various conflicts and 
contradictions. One of them is the constant struggle between safety and being “better, faster, 
cheaper” (Hollnagel, 2004). In a nuclear power plant there is also an inherent contradiction 
between decentralization and centralization (Perrow, 1999; Woods and Branlat, 2011; Reiman 
and Rollenhagen, 2012). Centralized control in a nuclear power plant organization stems from 
the need to have an overall picture or understanding of different parts of the system. The 
justification for having decentralized control is that a single centralized unit might not identify 
the cause of a disturbance if it relates to interactions within or between sub-systems; they 
could be best dealt by implementing expert solutions by personnel working directly with the 
sub-systems. Another typical conflict an organisation has to solve is the need to balance 
between acute and chronic goals and problems. Nuclear power plants have also to balance 
between investing on and developing specialist and/or generalist roles and competences 
(Hoffman and Woods, 2011). 
Such tensions will most likely apply to the design process as well, even though they have not 
been explicitly studied in this context. These kinds of tensions are not easily solved. Rather, 
they need to be constantly taken into consideration in the design process. 
5. Methods  
The objectives of this project were achieved by a number of case studies performed in Finland 
and Sweden. The case studies consisted of carrying out interviews with representative from 
power plant organisations, design organisations and regulators. In 2013, fourteen interviews 
were carried out. The semi-structured interviews followed the interview scheme presented in 
the Appendix. The set of questions were adapted depending on the topics discussed and 
complemented by other questions for deepening the understating of some specific aspects 
discussed during the interviews. The in-depth interviews of the Finnish case studies were also 
complemented by one group interview each. Their scope was to gather an overview picture of 
the design project and to provide background information for the following interviews.   
Since the main scope of the current study was to test and validate the relevance of the 
previously identified challenges, the analysis of the interviews started from the preliminary 
 results of the DESIGN SADE project. This was done by checking the responses interviewees 
gave at the explicit question “Do you agree with the following statement: (challenge 1, 2, 3 
etc.)”. Indications of the agreement or disagreement with the statement have then analysed 
from the interviews. Every time an interviewee expressed concern about some parts of the 
design process, or referred to obstacles or problems hindering the execution of the design 
project, it categorised as hinders, if and as appropriate, in the different categories of 
challenges. At the same time, all the indications of things going well, or considered 
potentially beneficial, have been collected and also categorised, as facilitators, according to 
the five macro-challenges. Facilitators are aspects that can enhance the design process and 
help in dealing with challenges, while hinders complicate the design process and impede the 
ability to deal with challenges. The possibility to revise the macro-challenges or to create new 
ones has been kept into consideration during the analysis. 
To understand the features of a good design safety culture, we referred to the six criteria for 
good safety culture developed at the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland (Reiman and 
Oedewald, 2009; Oedewald, et al., 2011; Reiman, et al., 2012):  
1. Safety is a genuine value in the organisation which reflects to decision making and 
daily activities; 
2. Safety is understood as a complex and systemic phenomenon; 
3. Hazards and core task requirements are understood thoroughly; 
4. Organization is mindful in its practices; 
5. Responsibility for the  safe functioning of the entire system is taken; 
6. Activities are organised in a manageable way. 
The criteria have been further summarised into three cornerstones of safe activities: mindset, 
understanding and organisational systems and structures (Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Cornerstones of safe activities (Oedewald, Pietikäinen & Reiman, 2011). 
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These criteria have been utilized for evaluating safety culture at Nordic nuclear power plants 
(e.g. see Oedewald et al., 2011), and can be applied for design safety culture as well. It can be 
 argued that design organisations, both in-house units or contractor companies, should have a 
certain shared mindset, where safety is valued, responsibility for the safety of the whole plant 
that will be utilising the designed object is taken, and constant vigilance or mindfulness is 
maintained.   
6. Results from the case studies  
The results of the different case studies performed in Finland and in Sweden during 2013 are 
presented in this chapter. As previously mentioned, the results are combined to avoid the 
possible identification of the design projects which have been studied in details and therefore 
to protect the anonymity of participants and organisations.  
The results are organised according to the following logic: for each challenge identified in the 
second phase of the NKS-R SADE project, it is first discussed if and why it was recognized 
and acknowledged by the interviewees. Then, for each challenge, more concrete and empirical 
evidence based on the collected data are presented. Finally, specific coping strategies or 
practices suggested by the interviewees as means they have been using or they consider useful 
for dealing with the challenges are presented.  
The five challenges identified in 2012 were as follows (see Macchi et al., 2013):  
1. Safety is not always the first and most important guiding value in the design process; 
2. Understanding the context where the designed end-product will be utilized may be 
difficult for the designers and this may lead to dysfunctional designs; 
3. Organisations do not always share the same safety philosophies and understand safety 
requirements in the same way; 
4. Coordinating activities may be difficult between organizations that work according to 
different logics and understandings; 
5. Distributing responsibilities and balancing roles between different stakeholders. 
 
We suggest that the five challenges could be related to the three cornerstones of safety culture 
as depicted in the following figure: 
 
Figure 2. Macro challenges and cornerstones of safety culture. 
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6.1. Challenge 1: Safety is not always the first and most important guiding value in the 
design process 
Safety should be a top priority when designing, operating and maintaining nuclear power 
plants. However, Macchi et al. (2013) concluded that the appropriate balance between safety 
and economics is not always easy to maintain, often due to the wide variety of actors involved 
in the design process, and their different values and missions. For example, when signing 
contracts with design organisations, power companies aim at a good bargain, and design 
organisations, especially when they act as consultants and/or subcontractors, consider the 
economic aspects of the deal to ensure their survival and sustainability in the short and long 
run. While sometimes power companies tend to sign contracts with design organizations 
without explaining in detail all the possible risks and complexities related to design projects in 
NPPs, there is also the tendency from design organisations to be reluctant to take into account 
new requirements once the contract is signed. From the regulator’s perspective, as reported 
during the interviews, it is challenging to carry out detailed inspections and to make demands 
while realising the strong commercial pressures power companies face. All in all, while 
balancing between competing values of safety and economics is a typical potential challenge 
that most complex systems face in their activities, our study indicated that the in reality 
interviewees have difficulties in recalling specific work situations, in which they had to make 
compromises.  
When asked if they personally have experienced situations in which compromises on safety 
had to be taken for cost related matters, or if they have ever heard something on this line 
going on in their company, most of the interviewees clearly said “no”. For example, one 
automation engineer expressed his/her opinion as follows: “I wouldn’t say that. I’ve always 
got what I’ve wanted. Never experienced this”. Another interviewee, also an automation 
engineering working as inspector at one of the companies’ nuclear reactor regulator 
department said “[…] I’ve experienced, for example, you could have a supervisor or a 
manager who makes financial decisions and they’ll say something along the lines that 
wouldn’t this do instead. Because they’re motivated by cost savings. But even in that case, the 
suggestion didn’t go through, safety was the priority”. And he/she continues acknowledging 
that “[…] a technical-financial comparison is made if requested or, in case of tenders, the 
emphasis is on certain functionality, what it costs and what can be achieved with it. And 
there’s a limit after which additional spending won’t increase nuclear power safety that 
much, so you need to consider whether the additional investment makes sense. At some point 
you make your mind up that that’ll do. No experience of this but endless spending might not 
increase safety”.  
This later perspective on the need to find a balance between safety and costs of design 
projects is very clear from one interview with a designer. The need to achieve reasonable and 
acceptable safe solutions considering financial and temporal pressures is summarised in 
his/her words as “sometimes it's not practical or… reasonable to (?) ask even the safest 
thing”.  
Talking in detail about a project he/she has been involved in the last years he/she said: “For 
example, this XXX project, we didn't, choose the, best or, safest, situation I must say. But on 
the other hand, in this modification... How can I say it? For example, in this time schedule we 
had no even possibility to choose that safest situation. […] We choose that we will just modify 
this (component, Ed.), in this XXX project, and other choice was that we will break it down 
and build three different (components, Ed.) over there. But, it has cost five to ten times more. 
Of course we had to, then we have designed and built totally new different kind of 
(components Ed.), but on the other hand it's, it was, it might be a little bit safer, but still it is”.  
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Regarding keeping a balance between competing aspects and finding acceptable solutions, an 
interviewee explains the way this decision-making process takes place in his/her organisation: 
“We make preliminary designing work, and we had three to four different options, and we 
calculate the price of those and think about the safety, and then inside the project we choose 
one what we think that it's best, option. And after that we present our opinion to the group 
(Steering group, Ed.), then they know why we chose it and how come it and that's why. It’s 
more likely that they will say that’s OK and then we can start.” 
In design processes it seems that the critical moment for safety is the development of 
preliminary planning. The preliminary plans are, however, often developed under economical 
and/or temporal pressure. As one designer pointed out “the more time you have to plan and 
consider things, the better it will work, but if you have to push it and work quickly, if for some 
reasons we have to complete it quickly […]mistakes can happen. […]But luckily this rarely 
happens”. In addition, as already mentioned, the need to implement new requirements in the 
actual design is not well seen by designers. New requirements can come from two sources: a) 
the power company that provides new details once a design contract is signed, and b) the 
regulator. As one automation designer stated “New ones (of authority regulations Ed.) are 
introduced constantly and finding a way to implement them here (is a challenge Ed.)”. The 
importance of preliminary planning was discussed as: “but it is more likely that mistakes 
occur in those jobs that have the lowest safety classifications. And this is usually because, the 
paperwork that we need, the preliminary plans are much less extensive. […] For many jobs 
which are class four there may be practically no preliminary planning. […]the best thing to 
do, of course, would be to write the preliminary plan for every job, and there’s no one saying 
you shouldn’t, but there’s not always enough time for that.” It should be noted that 
preliminary planning cannot completely eliminate all possible surprises; therefore they should 
be taken into account in the beginning of the design process by considering e.g. “slack” 
resources or agreement between the parties involved on some specific ways for dealing with 
surprises.  
Development of extensive preliminary planning is perceived challenging also for another 
reason. The approval process can be long and time consuming, and thus causing an overall 
increase in the perceived time pressure. Even if it is acknowledged that paper work is done for 
the sake of safety, with the increase of paperwork to prepare the plans in a way that will be 
acceptable for authorities it comes the fact that “the simplest of things can be made complex, 
and a lot of resources are tied to processing it, and then they aren’t available for the job 
itself” and last minute rush can become a norm as said in one of the interview “Well, I can’t 
deny pressures related to schedules. There is always a rush at the last moment”. The dilemma 
emerging from the need to balance safety and other pressures is well exemplified from the 
following quote from one of the interview. M1 is a representative from a power company and 
Q1 is one of the interviewers.  
 
M1: Well, maybe if we received a response from (the regulator) at this stage, and 
they’d be requesting additional information on issues related to safety, maybe 
then, because we aim to get the job done, and we only have a very hectic month to 
prepare the document to a stage that they are, that they’re satisfied with it […] 
but anyway. I mean that it would be better to receive the response sooner, so that 
we’d have enough time to implement. Of course, in terms of safety culture, we 
should say, at that stage, we should say we’re not implementing the job at all 
(since we won’t have time for proper) planning and design. But then of course, 
everyone understands that there’s pressure from the company, pressure to get it 
implemented.  
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Q1: Or if…Yes, but if the objective of the modification is to improve safety…  
M1: Yes, but if the modification can’t be implemented…  
Q1: ...and if it’s not implemented, of course it’s…  
M1: Yes, if we can’t do it now, it’ll be a year from now before it’s done. So that’s, 
it’ll be delayed by a year… 
Approaching this kind of dilemma requires taking into consideration the bigger picture of 
design activities, and how they contribute to the overall availability and safety of nuclear 
installations. This implies that it is insufficient to focus solely on the power company 
activities. Instead, the broader perspective includes also the activities of the other relevant 
network actors involved in the design process, such as regulators and contractors.  
Coping strategies associated with Challenge 1 
From the analysis of the interviews it was possible to identify a number of practices that the 
interviewees think are of help in maintaining safety as the guiding value in design processes. 
In some cases those practices were practically implemented, while in other cases they are 
rather principles that the interviewees called for.   
In the latter category goes the dealing with big external pressures for respecting schedules. It 
appears that it is not easy for design organizations to negotiate and to decide how to proceed 
with the possible safety effects of new demands or other surprises that could compromise the 
implementation schedule. Having more competent resources might help in keeping the 
schedules but it is not necessarily a solution for resisting the pressures. An interviewee stated 
that having more resources creates better conditions for avoiding compromises: “Well, there 
should be more of us - that’s my personal opinion”, which also increases opportunities for 
team work on executing design projects as it “avoids being struck with one’s own thoughts”. 
Maintaining safety as the top priority in design work was acknowledged by the interviewees. 
As an interviewee puts it: “I do trust the company enough to believe that it (selecting 
suppliers) won’t be a question of small differences in the sums. It would have to be vast 
difference in terms of money”. Good practice one of the interviewee experienced is to have 
design organisation and operating organisation as part of the same company. In his/her 
opinion and experience this would solve the economic pressure problem because “there is no 
need to fight for money, which is a very good thing. That kind of thing can never happen if 
there's a vendor and a client of fighting for money”.  
6.2. Challenge 2: Understanding the context where the designed end-product will be 
utilized may be difficult for the designers and this may lead to dysfunctional designs 
In nuclear power companies different departments, the regulator, consultancy companies and 
subcontractors play a role in the development of technological solutions. Some of the 
subcontractors are specialised in the nuclear domain as nuclear power have not been their core 
industrial domain. Consequently, some designers may have limited knowledge of operating 
plants layouts and strict requirements. Also for in-house technical departments it is possible 
that some designers based at the headquarters do not have an adequate representation of the 
actual plants. An interviewee put this concept in a very straightforward manner: “[…] some 
(designers Ed.) are more willing to come here and look what is, how the real life looks. But, 
for some people it's enough. They have the image in their own head that this is how it works 
and, this is my plan how to solve it and if anybody says anything against it, he or she just 
doesn't understand how it is supposed to work”. This kind of potential situation can lead to 
different problems, ranging from delays due to the need to revise the plans to the 
implementation of dysfunctional designs. As an example, an interviewee stated that “there 
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might happen this kind of, behind the desk designing. […]. For example some door will open 
wrong direction or something like that and, that's the only thing, if you just can't go… If you 
won't go that place you can't see it how it works so… […] But not very big issues but still, 
which might…Well, if you just try and design it, again it will cost lots of lots of money so it 
doesn't make sense anymore”. This problem could be complicated when using consultants in 
the design work. According to one interviewee, “even good designers in non-nuclear areas do 
not know the plant and they do not know what are the requirements, so very often they 
produce I would say, medium-quality designs”.  
The challenge of understanding appears therefore to be related to three aspects. One aspect is 
the context of operations of the end product, which includes the Human Factors perspective 
for taking into account the end-users’ future use of the product. At the root of this challenge 
apparently there is the scarce availability in Nordic countries of people with relevant HF 
competences in the operating organisations, and the need to rely extensively on consultants, 
especially in Sweden. The overall HFE process could be jeopardized if key HF aspects are not 
taken into account from the very beginning of the design projects. Also, misunderstandings in 
classification of projects (technology vs. HF driven) could result in late involvement of HF 
expertise. Still, specific HF expertise is not always the solution because sometimes it is 
important if the designer personally visits the plant and checks the plant layout for 
determining, for example, how exactly a door should be opened, or is it possible to maintain a 
valve if it is placed in certain way. As an interviewee put it, it must be known at an early stage 
“why it is designed and how it needs to work”.   
The other aspect refers to the understanding of the formalisms of design processes in the 
nuclear industry. When compiling and preparing the approval documentation, designers that 
are not familiar with the nuclear domain face also other challenges in performing effectively 
their work. The following quotes from interviews put it very clearly: “Many suppliers don’t 
know what kind of documents is needed and, that is a problem” and “consultants who aren't 
involved with nuclear power compile materials with lower quality”. Consequently, design 
process can result in significant delays and increased time pressure.  
The third aspect related to understanding refers to the effects of new design introduction into 
the existing system. According to one of the interviewees “the objective (of the design Ed.) is 
usually known, but not necessarily whether they introduce some undesirable features. It may 
be that’s what’s most challenging as regards the software-side of things in this sector”. A 
proper understanding of consequences of a new design introduction involves uncertainty, and 
obviously the unwanted side effects are ultimately revealed in the testing phase. 
Coping strategies associated with Challenge 2 
We identified a number of practices that the interviewees considered beneficial to support 
understanding in design processes. The first one refers to the understanding of the operation 
context in which the end-product will eventually be deployed and used. It was stated that it is 
often needed to support designers from consultancy companies and subcontractors, to have 
personnel from the plant involved in the specification of requirements for the design. A 
representative from one of the power companies stated that “if the project is big and supplier 
dependent, (the power company Ed.) is always involved; (the power company Ed.) 
representatives are there. They’ll have (The power company Ed.) know-how at their disposal. 
So if they can’t comment on a specific issue themselves, (the power company Ed.) is always 
involved in (this type of projects Ed). An automation engineer from one of the companies 
said: “I’ve been involved in practically everything, since I’m responsible for the systems 
related to the (certain component Ed.), and I know the technology, maybe not inside out […] 
Then I made sure that there were free contacts for the (component Ed.) to retrieve data; 
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whether more components are required and so on”. This refers to the ways of collaboration 
between the power company and the contractors, and how it is reflected in commercial 
contracts. For instance, in some cases the power company needs to support the contractors in 
many aspects throughout the process, while in other cases the power company might be 
reluctant to intervene to contractor’s areas of responsibilities. It is unclear though how this is 
handled in contracts, and who bears the financial responsibility if a system fails. Another 
interviewee reported that keeping control and oversight on the design process is an effective 
mean to avoid misunderstanding of the operational context and to facilitate the resolution of 
eventual problems: “We have designed in practice everything. Once there's a problem, it's 
easy to proceed because we have the knowledge, overall responsibility, and good staff. 
[…]We have the best knowledge of the plant”. 
The second group of supportive practices relates to understanding the users requirements of 
the end-product. It is fundamental that Human Factors competences are brought in when 
design contracts are written and signed: if power companies do not have sufficient in-house 
competences on Human Factors, they should invest resources for training and/or recruiting. A 
complementary strategy would be educating project participants in the basics of Human 
Factors knowledge to establish a shared view about the importance of this topic.  
The third group of means refers to understanding the risks and safety significance of new 
designs. Decisions concerning plant modifications should be done by competent persons. The 
suggested means for achieving proper understanding, according to the regulator was to ensure 
that “those making decisions are competent enough” and “they must have the understanding, 
and preferably also the experience […] because they decide what kind of products are 
developed and used at the plant”. To avoid misunderstanding of risks and safety significance, 
the importance of having organisational processes to keep track on previous design projects 
was highlighted. Documentation of previous design projects provides valuable insight on the 
history of some components, and how problems have been solved: “it makes (the design work 
Ed.) easier. […] You get enough advice and you remember what was done earlier so you can 
utilise that […] simply find some folders there, see what was done earlier and you start to 
look for solutions there.” 
6.3. Challenge 3: Organisations do not always share the same safety philosophies and 
understand safety requirements in the same way 
The challenge of having different safety philosophies, or perceptions of what is affecting 
safety, surfaced when the organisations involved in the same design process represent 
different national cultures. Possible misunderstandings of the concept of continuous 
improvement between foreign designers and the Finnish Regulator require additional 
interactions and communication. Moreover, misunderstandings concerning safety 
requirements may occur between operating organisations and design organisations even if 
they are from the same country. Obviously, different organisations and project members have 
different focus in the project work (e.g. technical/mechanical aspects, human factors aspects, 
construction, electrical aspects), which could create frictions in the execution of the design 
work. In order to harmonize these different perspectives, multiple disciplines need to be 
integrated and cooperation between personnel has to take place in order to find acceptable 
solutions. In the interviews, this challenge has been referred to as follows: ”That’s the 
classification documentation problem. There’s a system in place, and it has a safety class, but 
the division into operational parts is not accurate enough. […] But that’s a minor problem. In 
case of inaccurate documentation a minor conflict is possible between different departs”. By 
dividing the design into operational parts, there is the risk of losing the big picture in terms of 
functionality of the design projects.  
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The role of regulators in the design process was brought up in the interviews as well. 
According to one of the interviewee, regulators tend to look too much into details “as if they 
have to state an opinion”, instead of focusing on oversight of the overall safety. Some of the 
interviewees perceived that an increase of the paperwork, required by the regulator, subtracts 
resources from the actual design work.  
Further, different attitudes towards safety requirements of designers and those executing the 
designs in detail have surfaced. While the former emphasises conservative decision making, 
the latter may focus more on quality issues of their work. In one of the interview it was 
brought up that not only designers and operating personnel should understand the safety 
requirements, but also the people involved in the commercial contracts concerning the design 
process at the power companies.  
Coping strategies associated with Challenge 3 
In the analysis of the interviews it emerged that a practice for dealing with different 
perceptions of what is affecting safety was to closely collaborate with other partners. In this 
way divergences in understanding safety requirements was reduced and collaboration and 
cooperation run smoother. In his/her words this was “we work together; we work together so 
closely that coordination is part of cooperation”. To address the problem related to having 
adequate understanding of the Human Factors safety requirements, it was suggested to create 
a common definition among design projects’ participants of what is included in human 
factors.  
6.4. Challenge 4: Coordinating activities may be difficult between organizations that 
work according to different logics and understandings 
Coordination of activities in design processes is probably the most recognised challenge 
discussed by the interviewees, largely due to the nature of design activities in nuclear domain. 
Besides, the multiple stakeholders involved, different perspectives on this activity, iterative 
nature of the design work, and potential geographical distribution of partners all contribute to 
making coordination challenging.  
Coordination of activities is perceived especially challenging when design projects involve 
long subcontracting chains. The main problem is that the longer the chain is, the “the further 
down you go with the sub-supplier chains, the less they see the connection” between different 
nuclear safety aspects. Furthermore, the regulators require operating organisations to keep 
control on “everything to the last details” and make sure that manufacturing companies have a 
proper understanding of nuclear safety and on the functioning principles of nuclear power 
plants. A representative from regulators expressed his/her point about this issue as follows: 
“the challenges in the cooperation between us and the licence holder are well known, but I’d 
say we’ve managed them pretty well. What I don’t know, I mean, I see people from 
(consultancy company Ed.) there at the plant, during deployment inspections, but I’m not 
aware of the procedures in place between them and the client, I don’t know that side of 
things”. Actually, the challenge to understand to what extent the subcontractors are 
knowledgeable about the safety requirements could be related to different factors, such as 
unwillingness to disclose everything to the client, contractors’ tailoring their competences and 
processes to big client’s expectations to get the contracts signed, or resource issues related to 
inspecting and auditing potential contractors. Also, language barriers can emerge when 
suppliers and sub-suppliers have national background different from the purchasing 
organisation. 
Yet another challenge is to interact and coordinate with other stakeholders, including 
regulators and inspectors, to gather information about nuclear safety risks due to introduction 
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of new designs. This potential problem is emphasised when interacting with new 
organisations and in case new requirements have to be taken into consideration. When asked 
if he/she thinks coordinating activities are challenging, a representative from regulators said: 
“I agree, in particular when something new is designed, involving a new organisation and 
new requirements. It’s easier if you’ve already designed the product in the same organisation 
and with the same requirements”  
Dealing with regulatory requirements and the interaction with regulators was often discussed 
by the interviewees. The interaction and communication with the regulators during different 
case studies did not create any major problem thanks to well-established practices, such as 
existing design plan paper models and the routine of phone and face-to-face interactions. 
Nevertheless, sometimes understanding, interpreting and timely complying with the full range 
of authorities’ requirements and guidelines has proven to be challenging. The difficulty to 
write a clear plan with limited points for misinterpretations was reflected by one of the 
interviewees as follows: “what’s challenging is communicating with the authorities, in 
writing, on paper you know, since what we do is we may discuss an issue with the authorities 
over the phone and both parties are aware of the fact that writing unambiguously, it’s 
incredibly difficult. It’s easier to speak and explain something, to make it understandable. But 
since there has to be a document, we have to put it in writing and do our best to make the text 
as unambiguous as possible. I’d say that’s the biggest challenge in these jobs” 
Following guidelines can pose challenges even when they are internal. Human Factors 
guidelines are not always established since the very beginning of design projects and ad hoc 
ones are created in the process. Design processes seldom go by the book, and time and 
resources can be limited. It is often the case that for example suppliers need to close issues for 
commercial reasons and thereby some interactions are skipped. Interestingly, it was reported 
in one of the interviews that for the engineering community interactions are often perceived 
negatively since they are seen as expression of failures. Keeping track of the different stages 
of design projects by the different organisations involved was also reported as a challenge 
potentially leading to different participants “running their own race”. Paradoxically, when 
time pressure increases more reporting is needed and less time is available for doing the 
actual job.  
Some of the interviewees reported that parties are somehow getting a bit further from each 
other along the execution of design processes. In one relevant example this led to lack of 
operators’ involvement in the design process. According to one of the interviewee, during the 
critical period of definition of operators’ requirements, the operating company “was not 
actively participating in the project. Of course, say, due to our internal quality assurance 
procedures they were in verifying, everything that we produced but, spiritually they could've 
been more involved”. Intangible aspects, as the “personal chemistry” between participants to 
avoid clashes, or the personal commitment to the projects are important contributing factors 
for coordinating activities.  
Coping strategies associated with Challenge 4 
Probably due to the relevance of this challenge for all the parties interviewed during the case 
studies, a high number of practices which are in place throughout the network of 
organisations involved in the design processes were mentioned. Few of them are overarching 
for most of the challenges as the desire to have extra time for reviewing documentation before 
sending them to authorities, and to involve designers and Human Factors experts since the 
very beginning of design works. Others are more specific practices ranging from management 
practices to availability of supporting tools for the different phases of the projects.  
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Working in a team and having more discussion and communication within the different teams 
was deemed essential for ensuring good coordination of activities. Also improving leadership 
aspects and sense of responsibility for the different people involved in the projects were 
mentioned as supportive means for making things run smoothly. Commitment of operating 
companies was said to be achieved in one case study by nominating the person who will be 
responsible for the operation of the end product, the responsible for the outcome of the 
project. In that case a responsible person from the operating organisation was appointed as 
owner of the design project. 
Weekly contacts between design and operating organisations were also an established practice 
for supporting coordination. This routine was considered beneficial for ensuring a “110% 
connection between organisations” as a way to keep things moving in the desired direction 
through “continuous meetings, discussions, etc.” From a project management perspective, 
having and properly using IT tools was a positive factor for better following up the plans and 
schedules. IT supporting tools were also considered useful for facilitating the writing of 
extensive preliminary planning and documentation for authorities. By the implementation of 
such tools, two main results would be achieved: first, the writing process would speed up 
allowing more available time for the actual design work; and second, the use of IT support 
tools for preparing the documentation makes it easier to transfer requirements from “one 
document to another”. According to an interviewee this is especially important when the 
design work is subcontracted from the power company: “When we do it like this internally 
[…], it’s quite easy to track the requirements, but if we had external parties involved, it might 
be, somewhat problematic at times”. In addition, a tool ensuring consistency between 
documents with respect to requirements is fundamental for facilitating the process of approval 
“and then we write the preliminary plan, and there’s a paragraph that completes the 
requirement. But if there’s no link between them, the authority says that it’s here, but I can’t 
see that it’s there, because the link is missing between them”. 
Good practices are established for coordination of activities between power companies and 
authorities, such as informing authorities in advance about future jobs at the plants. Knowing 
who is responsible for what, who to call for information or clarifications clearly support the 
execution of design processes. Having face-to-face meeting between regulators and licensee 
to solve unclear points is considered from both sides a good practice. A representative from 
one of the regulators said that these occasions are used also for ensuring that the interpretation 
of guidelines is correct.  
6.5. Challenge 5: Distributing responsibilities and balancing roles between different 
stakeholders 
On one side there is the challenge of clearly defining responsibilities within one organisation 
and of ensuring that everyone and every department act as expected. Designers at one of the 
plants considered a certain project as successful despite that when tested it caused an event: 
designers believed though that it was not designers’ responsibility but the operators’. In this 
respect one representative from a power company said: “For example maintenance would like 
to plan our (designers Ed.) operating models. Of course we listen to what maintenance has to 
say, and discuss things. But the way it works here is that we don’t do the design based on that. 
We listen to other organisations, but at the end of the day, we have to make the design 
decisions and choose how we implement it”. At least in one of the power companies small 
projects, roles and responsibilities formally are determined by the circulation of the “folders” 
(i.e. of the documentation related to design work), as there are no project groups. However, in 
case of large design projects involving multiple stakeholders the roles are divided since 
“there’s a closely knit internal organisation, but in larger, bigger modifications, project 
groups can be quite large, when different organisations are involved. And there are internal 
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project meetings, discussing someone’s opinion and we find common ground and 
understanding”. Even if these formalisms are in place, it is still difficult to ensure that all 
involved partners understand the demands of the projects. In the reality of complex projects, it 
could happen that the project members do not know exactly who is responsible for what and 
who in practice is taking decisions. On the other hand, the decision-making is distributed 
because multiple viewpoints and competencies are needed.  
Besides, there is the challenge of defining roles and responsibilities between buyers and 
vendors and managing the interfaces when design activities are purchased from several 
subcontractors. As one of the interviewees put it “of course the, you know, customer’s 
supplier side, they try to specify the responsibilities and roles by using different documents, 
such as agreements, specifications, product-related quality control and so on. But as regards 
design of new things... Well, it can sometimes be unclear but I wouldn’t generalise it like 
that”. The perceived experience of designers plays an important role in reassuring the buyers 
that everything has been taken into account.  
Another aspect to be considered related to role and responsibilities concern the regulator vis-
à-vis the other stakeholders involved in the design process: to what extent the regulators 
should oversight the design activities of subcontractors? The position of regulators in this 
respect is that licensees are held responsible for the work and safety culture of subcontractors 
and suppliers. This attitude implies that the role of regulators is limited to the oversight of 
final products and the activities of power companies. Therefore, licensees should have the 
role of requiring and verifying that the companies they interact with effectively possess 
appropriate systems and structures, knowledge and understanding of risks, and mindset for the 
performance of good work. In a way this is a relief of responsibility for regulators, but it may 
be a burden, not only in terms of accountability but also in terms of resources and 
competences, for the licensee. The overall attitude of the regulator with respect to inspections 
was also subject of concern for some of the interviewees. The point that was raised was if the 
most effective focus of attention of regulator is on technical details or rather on the overall 
functioning and safety of the system.  
With respect to the modus operandi of regulators it is interesting to point out probably the 
main difference between the Finnish and Swedish regulatory agency. The main involvement 
of the regulator in the design process is in the approval of design documentation and 
following inspections to certify that the end-product respects the functional and safety 
requirements. It seems that STUK in Finland and SSM in Sweden pursue this objective in 
slightly different ways: STUK is involved in supporting the different stages of the design 
process by giving recommendations and suggestions for improvement even in informal 
settings, which at best leads to identifying potential problems as soon as possible.  
On the other hand it is important for the regulators to play an independent evaluator’s role, 
which is their core task. Being somehow involved in the different phases of design process 
questions this independency. How can they not interfere and suggest some directions for the 
companies when they evaluate the step-by-step design process in all its stages and see the 
situation with outsiders’ eyes? According to the interviews performed in Sweden, SSM seems 
to be more detached from the design process: the Swedish regulator intervenes only once the 
documentation is submitted for approval, which formally makes SSM more independent than 
STUK.  
On the other hand, a remarkable amount of time and resources are invested in the 
development of an end product without knowing if the design is ultimately the right one. The 
consequences of this could be that for fully approvable designs (or which requires small 
modifications) the evaluation will actually be considered as fully independent. For clearly 
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not-approval designs, it will be required to the licensee to invest resources for correcting 
them. For designs which are in a grey zone of acceptability in between the two (unlikely) 
extremes, there may be pressures (real or perceived) for temporal or economic reasons for 
approving them (especially if the gain in functionality and/or safety is minor compared to the 
cost of e.g. rethinking the design from its basis).    
Coping strategies associated with Challenge 5 
Good practices for coping with the challenge of attributing responsibilities between different 
stakeholders and fulfilling attributed roles were suggested during the interviews. For instance, 
one of the case organizations developed an internal project model for clarifying the execution 
of the projects, while another power company increased the number of professional project 
managers. For what concerns the Finnish system, the practice of having regular meetings with 
the regulator was perceived as very supportive for the successful execution of design projects 
to the extent that STUK has considered including it in the future YVL guides. As one of the 
interviewees from a power company said: “STUK had very good recording on what was 
going on, […] So I am very pleased to hear that […] this procedure […]  now it's written in 
the future YVL guides”. This will result in a formal recognition of the role of the regulator in 
the processes as being involved throughout the design projects to support the development of 
the end-products. To cope with the issue of knowing who is responsible for which parts of the 
development of the end-product in large complex projects, it was mentioned in the interviews 
that projects should be performed in-house: “It would be a different thing if there were several 
external organisations involved, then there might be problems, establishing who's doing 
what”. Human resourcing, in the sense of allocating the right person to the right position, was 
quite obviously considered important. This was especially the case for big projects, where a 
clear definition of responsibilities areas is needed for coping with the complexity of the work.  
6.7. The specifics of the nuclear industry as another challenge 
Another challenge has been reported during the interviews: working in a conservative 
industrial domain. This is represented in the way defences and safety measures are taken, in 
the way regulation is written, as well as in the way changes are dealt with. In the process of 
conceiving, designing, installing and maintaining technology, nuclear industry tends to rely 
on known, tested, validated and already implemented technological solutions. Even though 
conservatism is usually considered essential in ensuring safety, it can also pose some 
challenges. Implementation of new technologies based on for example digital solutions which 
may be safer and more effective than the currently used is challenging because it is not tested 
in nuclear plants. As one of the interviewees said: “The biggest compromise is the fact that 
the verification of new technologies is so complex, and expensive […] that even if we could 
implemented a finesse better with a new technology, it seems impossible to get it approved for 
use in a nuclear power plant“. The result of this conservative attitude is also that as time 
passes it becomes harder to find personnel, especially in the automation domain, trained and 
interested in dealing with old-fashioned technology. The opinion expressed in one of the 
interviews was that in the near future “there will be less and less people with sufficient 
understanding of functioning of the currently implement technology”. To address this issue, it 
would be required to establish training programmes focused on the functioning and 
developing of technologies acceptable according to the nuclear industry standards and to look 
for young personnel interested in learning about them. Another impact of the conservatism of 
nuclear industry is that procurement activities can become complicated even for simple 
equipment. Almost everything installed and used in a nuclear power plant has to respect strict 
safety standards and requires detailed documentation. Frequently there are increased costs and 
delays for obtaining components, which would otherwise be relatively cheap and more easily 
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available in other industrial domains. A summary of the challenges, coping strategies and 
their relevant cultural aspect is presented in Table 1.  
Table 1. Summary of identified organizational challenges, coping strategies and cultural aspects. 
Specific challenge Coping strategies Cultural aspect 
Challenge 1. Safety is not always the first and 
most important guiding value in the design 
process 
 
• To find an appropriate balance between safety 
and economics  
• To carry out detailed inspections and making 
demands while realising the strong commercial 
pressures power companies face 
• To achieve reasonable and acceptable safe 
solutions considering financial and temporal 
pressures 
• To develop extensive preliminary planning 
• To implement new requirements in the design 
• To prepare extensive paperwork for the approval 
results in more time pressure and less availability 
of resources for the actual design 
 
 
• Avoid big external pressures 
for respecting schedules 
• Have more competent human 
resources  
• Have great morality, to be 
mindful and concerned with 
nuclear safety  
• Have design organisation and 
operating organisation as part 
of the same company 
 
 
Shared mindset 
 
Challenge 2. Understanding the context where the 
designed end-product will be utilized may be 
difficult for the designers and this may lead to 
dysfunctional designs 
 
• To have limited knowledge of operating plants 
layouts and requirements by designers 
• To have a not adequate representation and image 
of the actual plants 
• To include Human Factors in the end-product  
• To understand the formalisms of design processes 
in the nuclear industry 
• To understand the effects of the introduction of a 
new design in the existing system 
 
 
 
 
 
• Have personnel from the 
plant involved in in the 
specification of requirements 
for the design 
• Keep control and oversight 
on the design process 
• Bring Human Factors 
competences in the process 
since the moment contracts 
are written and signed 
• Educate project participants 
in the basics of Human 
Factors  
• Select competent decision 
makers for plant 
modifications  
• Keep track and document 
previous design projects 
 
 
Understanding 
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Challenge 3. Organisations do not always share 
the same safety philosophies and understand 
safety requirements in the same way 
 
• To consider enough buffers when designing 
components 
• To have different foci (perspectives) of attention 
in the project work (e.g. technical/mechanical 
aspects, human factors aspects, construction, 
electrical aspects) 
• To have different perceptions on what is affecting 
safety  
• To have different attitude towards safety 
requirements and design (conservative decision 
making vs. focus on quality issues) 
 
 
 
 
• Have enough buffer capacity 
in the current and future 
designed systems 
• Create a common definition 
of what does human factor 
mean 
• Closely collaborate with 
other partners to create 
shared understanding on 
safety requirements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mindset  
Understanding 
 
Challenge 4. Coordinating activities may be 
difficult between organizations that work 
according to different logics and understandings 
 
• To manage long subcontracting chains 
• To deal with suppliers and sub-suppliers with 
different national background  
• To interact with new organisations with which 
there are no previous experiences of collaboration 
• To consider new requirements  
• To understand, interpret and comply with 
authorities’ requirements and guidelines 
• To communicate the respect of requirements and 
guidelines to authorities 
• To be overconfident on the effectiveness of the 
guidelines for running projects 
• To keep track of the different stages of design 
projects  
• To avoid parties getting further from each other 
along the execution of design processes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Reserve extra time for 
reviewing documentation 
• Involve designers and 
Human Factors experts 
since the very beginning  
• Work in teams and to have 
more discussion and 
communication within the 
different teams  
• Improve leadership and 
sense of responsibility 
• Nominate the person who 
will be responsible for the 
operation of the end product 
as responsible for the 
outcome of the project 
• Have weekly contacts 
between design and 
operating organisations  
• Use IT tools for better 
following up plans and 
schedules 
• Use IT tools for facilitating 
writing of extensive 
preliminary planning  
• Use IT tools for supporting 
consistency between 
documents with respect to 
requirements  
• Inform authorities in 
advance about future jobs  
• Have regular contacts and 
open relationships with the 
regulator, e.g. regular face-
to-face meetings between 
the regulator and licensee 
could clarify unclear points 
and solve problems 
 
 
Structure and 
processes 
Understanding 
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Challenge 5. Distributing responsibilities and 
balancing roles between different stakeholders 
 
• To define responsibilities within one organisation 
and to ensure that the everyone and every 
department act as expected 
• To make sure that all involved partners 
understand the demands of the projects 
• To define roles and responsibilities between 
buyers and vendors  
• To manage interfaces  between organisations 
• To define to what extent the regulators should 
oversight the design activities of subcontractors 
• To involve the regulator in the design process 
 
 
 
 
 
• Have regular meetings with 
the regulator  
• Perform in-house projects 
• Identify technical and 
human factors demands 
especially in the interaction 
with contractors 
 
Structure and 
processes 
Understanding  
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7. Discussion and conclusions 
The SADE DESIGN NKS project was structured in three phases. During the first phase 
(2011) we reviewed the relevant scientific literature and identified the topical human and 
organizational challenges related to the design process. The second phase (2012) focused 
more specifically on exploring the challenges and opportunities related to collaboration and 
communication between the designers and the end-users since design in the nuclear industry 
is usually performed by a network of organizations. Identifying and clarifying various 
tensions and trade-offs that people involved in design and management of nuclear power 
plants were seen as one means to resolve them. It should be noted that different network 
actors have different ways of balancing tendencies, and if the design network is not aware that 
there are tensions and different solutions to them, then miscommunication is likely to occur. 
We assume that the previous lessons learned have been taken into account by the design 
organizations in the nuclear industry.  
The third and final phase of this project (2013) aimed at testing and evaluating the results of 
the first two phases through in depth analysis of selected design case studies conducted in 
Finland and Sweden. Throughout the different case studies recurrent themes emerged. We 
related them to systemic aspects, which frame and influence the possibilities for conducting 
design projects safely and effectively. Some systemic aspects refer to the existence of 
temporal and economic pressures which, to a certain extent, compromise the optimal 
execution of design processes. The intrinsic uncertainty of designing end-products plays a 
role in the way design projects are performed, that is, by involving multiple stakeholders, 
which calls for extra effort in coordinating, understanding requirements and preparing 
documentations. Unfamiliarity with nuclear requirements and operational contexts is a 
potential source of suboptimal solutions. The general conservatism permeating the nuclear 
industry has an impact on both the possibilities to develop and implement innovative 
technical solutions, and on the time required for purchasing components to be used within the 
plants. It turned out that power company representatives often perceived “design” mainly as 
paper work, e.g. drafting documents and carrying out the required checks, whereas the 
innovation side was almost absent from their discussions.  
Design activities include developing ideas, negotiating, proposing and implementing solutions 
to real-life problems. However, the study indicated that the nuclear industry representatives 
approached the design processes mainly from “paperwork” point of view, focusing on review 
and approval of design plans; an approach, which is fairly insufficient. The quality of design 
was considered to depend largely on designer’s tacit knowledge and his/her understanding of 
the context and conditions where the technology/design solution is going to be implemented. 
However, design process involves both rational and creative approaches to a problem. 
Fulfilling specific requirements, including an extensive amount of paperwork, which requires 
time, resources and usually a long chain of approval by various stakeholders, is only part of 
what designers face in the nuclear industry. The other part of their work, though, refers to the 
need to create something new, which is both safe and functional. Thus, to better support 
human and organizational performance in design processes, the nuclear power companies, 
engineering companies and design supply chains need to nurture a culture that shares the 
importance of this dual perspective in a networked context.  
The study revealed that safety is clearly recognized as a top priority during design, operation, 
and maintenance of nuclear power plants. At the same time, participants in the design projects 
in this study mentioned the pressure of schedules and costs, which make them feel that at 
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times “safety first” principle was not always easy to implement in practice in the design 
process. To balance between these conflicting goals it is necessary to involve people with 
competencies in e.g. technology, human factors and economy in the planning of projects to 
discuss the potential conflicting goals and find an acceptable compromise. It is recommended 
that people involved in the design process and decision making should have at least basic 
knowledge in human factors.  
The need to provide all the required documents on time could also slow down the design 
process, especially for people not working inside the nuclear industry. The tendency to use 
and rely on tested and validated technology in the nuclear industry imposes a number of 
restrictions that may not always be known by outsiders of the industry. Organizations without 
knowledge of the conditions for nuclear power plants should be informed and learn about 
safety requirements in the industry, early in the design process, by representatives of the 
nuclear industry. To minimize time-consuming administrative tasks, it is recommended that 
appropriate IT support for documentation is used and clear working routines are established 
for reporting to authorities. 
The design organization and the operative organization should develop a common 
understanding of safety aspects in the design process. For instance, there should be 
communication and agreement on when a design change is a human factor or a technical 
issue. It is recommended to create an understanding of Human Factors and safety, which has a 
system perspective where both technical and human factors aspects are represented. It is also 
recommended that multidisciplinary groups participate in projects, where the work 
environment is affected by the design work. Entrepreneurs involved in large nuclear projects 
could also be provided with a basic education concerning safety in the nuclear domain. A 
safety culture should be implemented, meaning a culture where safety is a concern for all 
people involved in the design project. Incidents and mistakes should be reported without fear 
for blame or punishment. It should also be a culture where it is possible to learn from 
mistakes, and a culture that is flexible, where authority to make a decision depends upon 
expert knowledge and not on formal position in the organization. 
To understand how complex organizations function, Weick (1995) introduced the concept of 
sensemaking, which usually refers to how meaning is given to past experiences in 
organizations. According to the interviews in this study, the need to make sense of the effects 
of introducing new design in an existing system was pointed out as the possible side effects of 
a new system may be hard to predict. A recommendation is therefore to be prepared for side 
effects and actively look for them. To improve the possibilities  for stakeholders to understand 
the context for the designed end-product it is recommended to form groups of people with 
different competencies, technical as well as human factors competences, when modifications 
are planned, implemented and in operation and maintenance. Decisions should be taken by 
this group collectively. The availability of people with relevant Human Factors knowledge in 
the Nordic operating nuclear power organizations is somehow limited, so external consultants 
are often employed in the design process. In some cases consultants with relevant Human 
Factors knowledge are involved too late in the process to make any difference. 
The co-existence of different safety philosophies and understanding of safety requirements 
emerged from the interviews, and was especially pronounced in large and complex, multi-
cultural projects. Even organizations in the same country often have different perspectives, 
i.e., technical vs. organizational. The classification of safety-related problems could also vary, 
depending on the perspective of the classifier. Regulators are often focused on details, which 
create an increase in the paperwork needed. Operating personnel and designers were also 
reported to have different attitudes toward safety requirements: operating personnel tend to 
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favor conservative solutions, while designers focused on quality aspects. The demand from 
regulators to have optimal control over the design process can be challenging as well. 
Monitoring closely the progress of large and complex projects creates a risk that different 
stakeholders are doing their job without sufficient knowledge of the other stakeholders’ 
progress. The coordination of activities may be more or less lost, which may lead to tensions 
between involved stakeholders.  
Large and complex design projects in nuclear industry involve many partners with distributed 
work and distributed decision making. Besides, a conflict is possible between distributed and 
centralized decision making. Centralized decision making may increase control over the entire 
process but will put a strong burden on the decision makers and possibly slow down the 
working process. Decentralized decision making may be effective and make it easier to solve 
unexpected problems. A disadvantage is that it makes it harder to get a holistic view of the 
design process. It is recommended to create better IT support for documentation and 
communication of the process status.  
The existing literature on Highly Reliable Organizations (HROs) states that there are five 
principles to guide the work: 
• Principle 1: Preoccupation with failure 
It means that any lapse may be a symptom that something may be wrong with the system, 
something that could have severe consequences if several small errors happened to coincide. 
HROs encourage reporting of errors and are aware of liabilities of success, complacency, 
temptation to reduce safety margins, the drift into automatic processing.  
It is recommended to improve the incident and accident reporting system and closely analyze 
errors and do what is possible to learn from them.  
• Principle 2: Reluctance to simplify  
The world is complex, unstable, unpredictable, take steps to create a complete and nuanced 
picture of what you are facing. Welcome skepticism; accept diverse experience and different 
opinions. To recognizing something may be dangerous, superficial similarities between 
present and past events could lead you in the wrong direction.  
It is recommended to create groups of people with different educational backgrounds, i.e., 
technical and behavioral, to analyze the impact of changes when modifications of NPPs are 
planned.  
• Principle 3: Sensitivity to operations 
Be attentive to the front line or the sharp end where the actual work is being done. The “big 
picture” in HROs is less strategic and more situational than in most other organizations.  
It is recommended to involve operating personnel early in the planning of changes. 
• Principle 4: Commitment to resilience 
No system is perfect and we must learn from failure. The essence of resilience is the intrinsic 
ability of an organization (system) to maintain or regain a dynamically stable state, which 
allows it to continue operations after a major problem or during continuous stress.  HROs 
develop capabilities to detect, contain, and bounce back from those inevitable errors that are a 
part of an undetermined world. Not error-free, but errors that do not disable it. Resilience is a 
combination of keeping errors small and of improvising strategies that allow the system to 
function. The demands are deep knowledge of technology, the system, one’s coworkers, and 
oneself.  
It is recommended to create groups of people with different backgrounds and give them the 
task of creating worst case scenarios and ways to cope with these scenarios. 
• Principle 5: Deference to expertise 
HROs prefer diversity because it helps them to notice more in complex organizations and to 
act more. Rigid hierarchies have their own special vulnerability to error. Errors at higher 
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levels tend to pick up and combine with errors at lower levels, making the problem bigger, 
harder to understand, and more prone to escalation.  HROs push decision making down and 
around. Decisions are made on the front line, authority mitigates to the people with the most 
expertise, regardless of their rank.   It is recommended to create an organizational structure 
that allows people with expert knowledge have an impact on important decisions, regardless 
of their position in the organizations hierarchy. 
To be resilient, an organization must be able to cope with disturbances, and to have the 
capacity to anticipate disturbances that have never occurred before but are still possible in the 
future. It is recommended to create groups of employees with different backgrounds and give 
them the task to invent new possible disturbances with safety implications. After that, develop 
coping strategies for these new, more or less likely disturbances. The interviews in this study 
provided strong support for the importance and challenge of coordination and collaboration, 
especially in large complex projects with suppliers and sub-suppliers, different cultures, 
language barriers, and different opinions concerning safety requirements.  
It is recommended to use IT support in order to monitor and visualize the project and the 
status of the different parts. To control a system the operator must have a mental model of the 
system (Conant and Aschby, 1970) and to communicate it to all involved stakeholders in a 
meaningful way. This is one possible way to improve the shared mental model of the 
stakeholders. Communication about delays and reasons for delays could possibly improve the 
interaction between stakeholders and reduce tensions and conflicts. The complexity of a 
project should have an impact on the size of the steering committee, and a multidisciplinary 
approach is probably the only way to proceed. Human Factors aspects should be recognized 
early, to avoid surprises later in the process. 
Studies of dynamic decision-making (e.g. Brehmer, 1992) have identified a number of sub-
optimal strategies to control large and complex projects. For instance, encapsulation, or 
maintaining a narrow focus on a single part of the problem and ignoring its connection to 
other parts have been demonstrated in experimental studies. Thematic vagabonding, meaning 
jumping from one topic to another topic quickly, without going into necessary detail, has also 
been identified. Improper delegation and shift in responsibility to others, and blaming them 
when things go wrong has also been identified. It seems that these strategies also may occur 
in real life and should be avoided. 
The challenge is to clearly distribute responsibilities and balance roles between the involved 
stakeholders. In complex projects it is sometimes hard to know who is responsible for what 
and who should decide the progress of the work. A challenge has been reported when defining 
the responsibilities between the operating organization and their demands on a product and 
sellers expectations. Lack of specification of the desired product/service has sometimes 
caused extra discussions and negotiations, and consequently delays in the process. Another 
problem mentioned was the Regulators’ preoccupation with technical details instead of a 
focus on the overall functioning of the system. The difference between authorities in Finland 
and Sweden, where the Finnish authorities follow the process closely and are early involved 
was discussed. The Swedish authorities are usually not directly involved in the process. These 
different strategies have both advantages and disadvantages and the question is which strategy 
is most efficient. To cope with the problems a strategy was to have regular meetings with the 
regulators. A recommendation is to make specifications of products or services more explicit 
to avoid long discussions concerning what was expected from the supplier. 
Another challenge that emerged was the conservative nature of the nuclear domain. Since 
products must be tested and verified before they can be used, and operators are used to 
established practices and tools, the use of newer technology often is delayed. This is, of 
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course positive from a safety perspective, but also means that it may be hard to recruit people 
to an organization where the advantage of new technology takes a long time. An often 
reported time consuming challenge is the administrative burden of documentation. Routines 
and support systems could possibly make this time consuming burden less time consuming 
and make it possible to devote more time to the actual design work. 
One of the main conclusions of this study is that challenges in the design processes in the 
nuclear domain are mainly inter-organizational. The previous literature seems to focus on the 
design process and design phenomenon itself and not on the challenges that arise in a network 
of organisations involved in design, which takes place when designing to a highly 
conservative and demanding domain. Overall, the study revealed that for some of the 
challenges (e.g. coordination) there are plenty of existing practices applied throughout the 
network of organisations involved in the design processes. However, for others, such as 
shared understanding, just a few coping strategies were mentioned.  
The study indicated that interaction is needed between design and other organisations 
regarding shared and improved understanding of issues important to safety in design in the 
nuclear domain. This interaction should take place in the continuum of explicit requirements 
that all stakeholders should be aware of to the less easily expressible safety values and safety 
philosophy. A way or working should be shared among stakeholders that facilitate mutual 
understanding and knowledge transfer of acute matters as well as underlying principles and 
facts which may emerge as more urgent at some phase of the design process.  
8. Summary of recommendations 
The study provides a set of recommendations to the nuclear industry community to support 
and improve the design process and to anticipate emerging risks. The design process evolves 
in a complex system operating under uncertainties, with multiple interdisciplinary 
international stakeholders with conflicting goals, under time and financial pressures where 
safety is critically important. We recommend that to improve design processes in the nuclear 
domain, the nuclear industry community should concentrate on following practices: 
 
• Develop “design thinking”  
o Acknowledge that designers working on safety-critical systems and 
components need to balance their role of innovators and rational problem 
solvers set by the nuclear power specific technical design principles. To 
develop safe and functional design in the nuclear power domain, designers 
need to balance between creating something new and dealing with an extensive 
amount of paperwork. Although in the conservative context of the nuclear 
industry the operators are used to well-established tools and solutions, it should 
be recognized that the design process it is not only about drafting documents 
and carrying out required checks; it is also about innovation and creating new 
solutions for particular problems.  
o Assist designers in strengthening their process skills by creating 
conditions for them to “immerse” in active, flexible and reflective exploration 
of the problem space he/she is working with.  
• Develop and support “design safety culture” 
o Create blame-free environment, in which design errors are reported early 
and documented properly, and develop efficient systems for incident reporting 
and organizational learning. Recognize that leadership can shift in different 
situations depending on the need for specific expertise. Ensure that all people 
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involved in the design process and the decision making have at least basic 
knowledge in human factors and safety culture.  
o Involve human factors expertise in negotiations and during the whole 
design process and highlight the positive aspects of interactions for the 
engineering community. 
• Improve communication and coordination of activities 
o Since challenges in the design processes in the nuclear domain are 
mainly inter-organizational, safety management and safety culture approaches 
should take better into account the inter-organisational nature of the work 
processes in design.  
o Develop transparent decision-making processes.  
o Document and store properly the information. Support designers in using 
IT tools for continuously documenting the design process, including providing 
arguments for design decisions, e.g. why one solution is preferred to another. 
Allow sufficient and realistic time for performing documentation tasks. Make 
sure the information is structured in such a way that makes it easy to find and 
follow up the history of specific design decision. 
o Keep track on the different stages of design project; avoid different 
organisations involved in the design process to “run their own race”. 
o Acknowledge the possible risks involved: increased communication 
should not lead to “group think” situations because this might produce 
imperfect or even wrong design solutions.  
• Create a shared understanding of safety conditions and operational requirements in 
nuclear industry for all stakeholders involved in the design process.  
o Construct shared plans for future actions, resources, etc. in a distributed 
network of several stakeholders by applying e.g. multi-agent planning 
approach. Provide each stakeholder with timely and correct information about 
the other relevant actors, as well as means to resolve conflicts. Acknowledge 
that information is spreading also largely through informal networking.  
o In dynamic and complex environments, use partial global planning 
approach by continuously updating the information and reformulate shared 
plans in view of new information. Recognize that local actors need freedom to 
build their own plans and these are shared with others in the network to 
improve coordination. Create conditions and shared spaces for technicians and 
HF people to work together. Involve end-users and operators in all phases of 
the design process, if relevant. 
o To better manage safety culture in design activities in a networked 
context, nurture a shared understanding between the nuclear power companies 
and design supply chains on the “dual perspective” of design - improve the 
understanding that design process involves both rational and creative 
approaches to a real-life problem.  
• Develop a systemic perspective throughout the design process  
o Develop a holistic overview of the design process - draw the system’s 
boundary widely to include relevant interdisciplinary and international 
stakeholders important for the success of a safety-critical design project.  
o To help imagine short-term and long-term consequences of design 
solutions, acknowledge the interrelations of technical, human and social issues 
and their effects on the outcome of the design process. 
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Appendix – Interview scheme 
Baseline: recorded group interview. A timeline with events will be made with start date and 
(previsioned) future end date. Beforehand needed: permission needed for the recordings and 
the participants should be asked to prepare to talk about how the project has proceeded in the 
past and will proceed in the future. 
First questions: 
• Object of design: what is the object of the design? What is the significance of the 
design for nuclear safety (safety class) and for the functioning of the plant? What is 
the scale (small – medium – large) of the design? Type of the design (muutostyyppi)? 
What types of technical disciplines or competences/expertise are needed for the design 
(automation, mechanical, electrical, human factors, experience from operators etc.)? 
At what stage is the design?  
• Why the design? What initiated it? When did it start and what was the reason for 
starting it? (e.g. the original design of the plant, deficiencies found during the use of 
the plant, new requirements, operating experience review in the industry, production 
or financial drive)? 
Secondly, a spread sheet (Excel sheet) will be filled jointly; guidelines for the making:  
• Building timeline of the project with relevant episodes that interviewees bring up and 
description of the episodes (what was done by whom (in collaboration with whom))?  
 
1) In-depth interview (individual interview) 
Baseline: individual interview with audio recording.  
Background of the interviewee 
 Educational background /degree 
 Title  
 Position in the company (to which group/unit does the interviewee belong to) 
 Years working in the company 
 Years working in similar kind of work  
 If there is other relevant work experience, what is it? 
The design process story from the perspective of the interviewee  
The jointly made “Project timeline” will be used as a reference here. 
1) Can you define design (work)? How do you understand what design is about? (is there 
any special features of designing?)   
2) Can you describe in your own words and from your own perspective, how has this 
design process proceeded, is there anything you would like to amend at this point or 
do you concur with the sheet? 
3) What have been the most challenging events or episodes (on the spread sheet)? -> If 
nothing has been challenging, ask for (three of) the most challenging. -> Describe 
reasons as to why they have been challenging and how have you dealt with these 
challenges. 
4) What have been especially well accomplished events, what has been done especially 
well? -> Why? 
5) What have been badly or non-optimally accomplished events, what has not been done 
right? -> If none, mention the least successful event. -> Explain further, why?  
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6) Were there challenges in collaboration between the different actors? What were these 
challenges like? How did you deal with the challenges? 
7) Were there any specifically good practices (“erityisen toimivia tähän 
suunnittelutyöhön liittyviä käytäntöjä/ toimintatapoja”) that you would like to mention 
at this point (in addition to those that have been already noted)?  
8) Were there any specifically bad or imperfect practices (“jotain suunnittelukäytäntöjä, 
jotka eivät ole olleet hyviä tai jotka voisivat olla parempia”) that you would like to 
mention at this point (in addition to those that have been already noted)? 
9) Can you compare the way this design work has been carried out with other projects 
and/or other experiences you have been involved in? 
 
2) Challenges 
Continuation in individual interviews. 
Preparation: “Next we will present some provocative statements about NPP design in general 
(that is not related to your current design case) and would like your comments on them.” 
(Each statement will be presented on a sheet of paper.) 
Statements: 
A. Ei aina täysin ymmärretä, mitä lopputarkoitus varten ydinvoimalassa jokin asia 
suunnitellaan ja tämä voi johtaa epäonnistuneisiin suunnitteluratkaisuihin. (Eng. It is 
not always completely understood why, that is, to which final purpose in NPP, certain 
issue is designed for and this causes poor design outcomes.) (Understanding the 
context where the design will be utilized may be difficult for the designers and this 
may lead to dysfunctional designs.) 
B. Käsitys hyvästä turvallisuudesta ja turvallisuuteen vaikuttavissa asioissa vaihtelee eri 
organisaatioissa; tämä tuottaa ongelmia ydinvoimalaitoksen suunnittelussa. (Eng. 
Understanding on good safety ja on issues that influence safety varies in different 
organisations; this causes problems for NPP design.) (Safety philosophies may differ 
between different organizations.)  
C. Ydinvoimalaitoksen suunnitteluun liittyvien aktiviteettien koordinointi on hankalaa, 
koska eri organisaatiolla on erilaisia käsityksiä ja toimintalogiikoita. (Eng. 
Coordinating activities related to NPP design is difficult because different 
organisations have different understandings and activity logics.) (Coordinating 
activities may be difficult between organizations that work according to different 
logics and understandings.) 
D. Tehtävien ja roolien jako eri organisaatioiden kesken vaatii tarkkaa harkintaa 
ydinvoimalaitoksen (tai jonkin sen osan) suunnittelussa. (Eng. The distribution of 
tasks and roles among different organisations is challenging in NPP design (or in 
designing something for NPPs). Distributing responsibilities and balancing roles 
between different stakeholders needs careful consideration. 
E. On tilanteita, joissa kustannuksiin liittyvät tekijät vaikuttavat ydinvoimalan 
suunnittelussa siten, että tehdään kompromisseja turvallisuuden suhteen eli kaikkein 
turvallisinta vaihtoehtoa tai toimintatapaa ei valita. (Eng. There are situations in NPP 
design in which issues related to cost-effectiveness influence so that compromises 
regarding safety are made, that is, the safest option or practice will not be selected.) 
(Safety is not always the first and most important guiding value in the design process 
and commercial pressures may hinder safety.) 
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